Volume 8, Issue 15 , September 2018, , Pages 127-141
Abstract
The history of pure science-applied science distinction goes back to 19th century. Philosophers of science and technology and science studies practitioners since then have been involved in how to separate pure from applied science. The linear model of the distinction is one of the oldest models on which ...
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The history of pure science-applied science distinction goes back to 19th century. Philosophers of science and technology and science studies practitioners since then have been involved in how to separate pure from applied science. The linear model of the distinction is one of the oldest models on which the goal of pure science is acquiring knowledge, while applied science tries to solve practical problems. In this article, I will argue that the liner model to draw the distinction in nano-science is inadequate. So, another account is needed to distinguish them, provided that our assumption about the distinction per se in nano-science is applicable
Volume 5, Issue 9 , September 2015, , Pages 143-161
Abstract
According to the logical empiricists, the received view, a scientific theory is a set of propositions formalized in first-order logic. According to the rival view, semantic or non-propositional view, it is a set of models. In this article, I will argue that the received view cannot suggest an ...
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According to the logical empiricists, the received view, a scientific theory is a set of propositions formalized in first-order logic. According to the rival view, semantic or non-propositional view, it is a set of models. In this article, I will argue that the received view cannot suggest an acceptable model for identifying the generalized forces in classical mechanics. In the second section, the invariance of Lagrange equations and its consequences are discussed. Besides, I show that the invariance implies that alike physical magnitudes will be different dimensionally. The third section firstly introduces the last version of the received view. After that, it is argued that Lagrangian mechanics formalized in this view cannot identify alike physical magnitudes similarly. In the last section, the semantic view of Suppes-Sneed and Lagrangian mechanics in this view are introduced. Finally, I show that this view can identify alike physical magnitudes similarly.
